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Abstract. Rebound effects measure the behaviorally induced offset in the reduction of
energy consumption following efficiency improvements. Using panel estimation me-
thods and household travel diary data collected in Germany between 1997 and 2009,
this study identifies the rebound effect in private transport by allowing for the pos-
sibility that fuel price elasticities – from which rebound effects can be derived – are
asymmetric. This approach rests on evidence that has emerged from the empirical li-
terature suggesting that the response in individual travel demand to price increases
is stronger than to decreases. With a rebound effect estimate for single-vehicle house-
holds of 58%, our result is in line with a recent German study by FRONDEL, PETERS,
and VANCE (2008), but is substantially larger than those obtained from other studies.
Moreover, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the magnitude of the response to a price
increase is equal to that of a price decrease.
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1 Introduction
Energy efficiency standards are highly in fashion as an instrument of climate protec-
tion policy in the European Union (EU), covering such diverse items as light bulbs
(FRONDEL, LOHMANN, 2011) and automotive technology. These measures are seen as
a cornerstone in efforts to meet the EU’s international commitments to reduce green-
house gases and achieve energy security. In the transport sector, which accounts for
roughly 20% of the EU’s CO2 emissions, regulation 443/2009 sets limits on the allowa-
ble per-kilometer CO2 emissions of newly registered automobiles, and includes legally
codified targets for the maximum CO2 discharges per kilometer that increase with the
mass of vehicles. As non-compliance with the allowable emissions will result in heavy
fines starting in 2012, the European Commission expects that this measure will indu-
ce considerable incentives for the development of fuel-saving technologies (FRONDEL,
SCHMIDT, and VANCE, 2011).
Irrespective of the directive’s effectiveness in increasing the average fuel efficien-
cy of Europe’s automobile fleet, a critical issue in gauging its merits concerns how
consumers adjust to altered unit costs of car travel. Presuming that mobility is a con-
ventional good, then a decrease in these costs would result in an increased demand
for car travel. This demand increase is referred to as the rebound effect (KHAZZOOM,
1980), as it offsets – at least partially – the reduction in energy demand that would re-
sult from an increase in efficiency. Though the existence of the rebound effect is widely
accepted, its magnitude remains a contentious issue (e. g. BROOKES, 2000; BINSWAN-
GER, 2001; SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS, 2008). A survey by GOODWIN, DARGAY,
and HANLY (2004), for example, cites mean fuel demand elasticities – from which re-
bound effects can be derived – varying between -0.1 in the short-run and -1.1 in the
long-run. More recent work by WEST (2004) and FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008),
who use household-level pooled and panel data from the U.S. and Germany, puts the
estimated rebound effect at the high end of this range, averaging between 87% and
57%, respectively.
Several factors may account for the wide range in estimates, including differences
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in the level of data aggregation, in the estimation methods employed, and in the defini-
tion of the rebound effect. A further issue that has complicated efforts to estimate fuel
price elasticities relates to the possibility that motorists respond asymmetrically to fuel
price increases and decreases. In particular, several studies have emerged suggesting
that the response to price increases is stronger than the response to price decreases.
As GATELY (1992) and others have argued, asset fixity provides one explanation for
this so-called hysteresis1: improved auto design features that emerge in response to
higher fuel prices are unlikely to be abandoned after prices fall, giving rise to a mu-
ted demand response. Numerous empirical studies by DARGAY (1992), GATELY (1992),
HOGAN (1993), DARGAY and GATELY (1994, 1997), GATELY and HUNTINGTON (2002),
and HUNTINGTON (2006) lend support to this view.
GRIFFEN and SCHULMAN (2005) have countered that the plausibility of asset fixi-
ty notwithstanding, it is incorrect to associate this with an asymmetric price response.
Rather, these authors suggest that energy-saving technical change yields the spurious
appearance of differing consumer reactions to price increases and decreases. When
GRIFFEN and SCHULMAN include time dummies to account for technical change in
their panel model of oil and energy consumption in the OECD, they conclude that
a symmetric price response cannot be rejected. In an earlier analysis that takes in-
to account inter-fuel substitution for residential energy demand, RYAN, WANG, and
PLOURDE (1996) also find no evidence for asymmetric price responses.
The absence of a clear consensus on the existence of an asymmetric fuel response
has important implications for policy analysis, not only with respect to projections of
gasoline demand (GATELY 1992), but also with respect to assessments of fuel taxati-
on as a transport demand management tool. As DARGAY (1993:89) has noted, were an
asymmetry to exist, then at least part of the demand reduction generated by fuel pri-
ce increases would be maintained even following a return to lower prices. This logic
carries directly over to the analysis of the efficiency standards and the rebound effect:
If the response to increases in the per kilometer cost of driving is measurably stronger
1The notion of hysteresis originates from the physics of magnetism and refers to an effect that persists
after its cause has been removed (DARGAY, GATELY, 1997:71).
2
than the response to decreases, then naive calculations of the rebound effect based on
reversibility would be overestimated.
Using data from the German Mobility Panel, the present study advances under-
standing of fuel price asymmetries in several respects. First, contrasting with the typi-
cal reliance on time-series or aggregated country-level panel data, the data used here
is drawn from individual households whose mobility behavior is surveyed for up to
three consecutive years. This focus circumvents many of the identification challenges
that confront studies using more aggregate data. Our data structure effectively allows
isolation of the short-run behavioral response to changes in fuel prices by focusing on
households that have not changed their cars over the three years they are surveyed,
thereby reducing the possibility that technical change is driving the result.
Second, for empirical reasons, we suggest an alternate definition of the rebound
effect that is based on the fuel price elasticity of travel demand. Contrary to conven-
tional definitions that are based on potentially endogenous measures of efficiency, this
rebound definition readily lends itself to an asymmetric modeling of fuel price respon-
ses. Presuming that the asymmetry assumption is found to be correct, it would imply
that the rebound effect is consequently identified by an elasticity estimate that reflects
changes in traveling demand due to decreases in fuel prices, as the rebound effect oc-
curs in response to a decrease in unit cost for car travel due to improved fuel efficiency.
Finally, expanding on the single-car focus of FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008),
the data set analyzed here includes multiple-vehicle households, thereby allowing us
to explore the sensitivity of the estimates to their inclusion. In addition, the robust-
ness and sensitivity of the results of the former study is checked by employing four
additional waves of data for the years 2006 to 2009.
The following section provides for a discussion on the choice of either of the com-
mon definitions of the direct rebound effect for estimation purposes. Section 3 presents
a concise description of the panel data set, building the basis for the empirical esti-
mation. Section 4 describes our estimation method, followed by the presentation and
interpretation of the results in Section 5. The last section summarizes and concludes.
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2 A Variety of Rebound Definitions
Along the lines of SORRELL and DIMITROUPOULOS (2008), we now catalogue three wi-
dely known definitions of the direct rebound effect that are based on elasticities with
respect to changes of either efficiencies, service-, or fuel prices. First, the most natu-
ral definition of the direct rebound effect is based on the elasticity of the demand for a
particular energy service, such as conveyance, with respect to efficiency (see e. g. BERK-
HOUT et al., 2000). This definition reflects the relative change in service demand s due
to a percentage increase in efficiency µ:2
Definition 1: ηµ(s) :=
∂ ln s
∂ ln µ
, (1)
Second, instead of ηµ(s), empirical estimates of the rebound effect are frequently
based on the negative of the price elasticity of service demand, ηps(s) (e.g. BINSWAN-
GER, 2001). As is shown, e. g. , by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008:161), both
rebound definitions are equivalent if, first, fuel prices pe are exogenous and, second,
service demand s solely depends on the service price ps := pe/µ, which is proportio-
nal to the fuel price pe for given efficiency µ:
Definition 2: ηµ(s) = −ηps(s) . (2)
2In line with the economic literature (e. g. BINSWANGER, 2001:121), energy efficiency is defined here
by
µ =
s
e
> 0,
where the efficiency parameter µ characterizes the technology with which a service demand s is satis-
fied and e denotes the energy input employed for a service such as mobility. For the specific example
of individual conveyance, parameter µ designates fuel efficiency, which can be measured in terms of
vehicle kilometers per liter of fuel input. The efficiency definition reflects the fact that the higher the
efficiency µ of a given technology, the less energy e = s/µ is required for the provision of a service. The
above efficiency definition assumes proportionality between service level and energy input regardless
of the level – a simplifying assumption that may not be true in general, but provides for a convenient
first-order approximation of the relationship of s with respect to e.
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That the rebound may be captured by −ηps(s) reflects the fact that the direct rebound
effect is, in essence, a price effect, which works through shrinking service prices ps.
Third, empirical estimates of the rebound effect are sometimes necessarily ba-
sed on the negative own-price elasticity of fuel consumption, −ηpe(e), rather than on
−ηps(s), because data on fuel consumption and fuel prices is more commonly available
than on service demand and service prices.
Definition 3: ηµ(s) = −ηpe(e) . (3)
Definitions 2 and 3, however, are only equivalent if the energy efficiency µ is constant
(FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE, 2008:161). That is, the rebound definition given by
−ηpe(e) is equivalent to that given by ηµ(s) only if three preconditions hold true: (1)
fuel prices pe are exogenous, (2) service demand s solely depends on the service price
ps, and (3) efficiency µ is constant.
To analyze asymmetric responses to changing driving costs, we focus here on a
fourth definition of the rebound effect that is given by the negative of the fuel price ela-
sticity ηpe(s) of the demand for transport services s. This focus is warranted for several
reasons. First, while the most natural definition of the direct rebound effect is based on
the elasticity of transport demand with respect to efficiency µ, Definition 1 is frequent-
ly not applicable, because in many empirical studies efficiency data is not available or
the data provides only limited variation in efficiencies (SORRELL, DIMITROUPOULOS,
SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1359).
Even more disconcerting is that observed efficiency increases may be endoge-
nous, rather than reflecting autonomous efficiency improvements. This is the case, for
instance, if a more efficient car is purchased in response to a job change that results in a
longer commute. Hence, due to the likely endogeneity of fuel efficiency (see e. g. SOR-
RELL, DIMITROUPOULOS, SOMMERVILLE, 2009:1361), it would be wise to refrain from
including this variable in any model specification aiming at estimating the response
to fuel price effects, as fuel efficiency may be a bad control (ANGRIST and PISCHKE,
2009:63). Rather than excluding µ from the analysis, alternative approaches are instru-
ment variable (IV) estimations or simultaneous equations systems that explain vehicle
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miles traveled, fuel efficiency, and vehicle numbers at once. As we have no instrument
at hand, we are unable to employ IV methods to cope with the endogeneity of µ, nor
are we able to estimate simultaneous equations systems due to data unavailability. In
effect, we instead pursue the reduced form of such a simultaneous equations system.
Another problem emerging from the likely endogeneity of the efficiency µ is that
it contaminates the rebound definition based on the negative of the service demand
elasticity ηps(s) with respect to service price ps, which is given by ps = pe/µ. This
highlights a handicap of Definition 2, namely that service prices represent a conglome-
rate of efficiency and fuel prices, while more meaningful estimates of the rebound are
based on estimations in which fuel-price and efficiency effects are strictly separated.
The rebound definition that is based on the own-price elasticity of fuel consump-
tion, ηpe(e), is the most restrictive of these three definitions, as it requires the validity
of three preconditions, rather than merely two of them, as is the case with rebound
definition −ηps(s). Furthermore, in contrast to transport service demand s, the depen-
dent variable e underlying definition −ηpe(e) explicitly depends on efficiency µ. For
example, fuel consumption e would ceteris paribus reduce to half if efficiency µ were to
be doubled. This example illustrates that the likely endogenous variable µ needs to be
included in any model specification for estimating ηpe(e), thereby potentially biasing
the empirical results.
For these reasons, we employ here a fourth rebound definition that is based on
the negative of the fuel price elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s):
Definition 4: ηµ(s) = −ηpe(s) . (4)
It is shown in the Appendix that −ηpe(s) is equivalent to ηµ(s) under the same ass-
umptions as the rebound definition given by −ηpe(e).
In sum, although theory would suggest estimating the efficiency elasticity ηµ(s)
to capture the rebound, the most promising empirical, yet indirect way to elicit the
rebound effect is based on the estimation of fuel price elasticities, as fuel prices typi-
cally exhibit sufficient variation and, in contrast to fuel efficiency, can be regarded as
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parameters that are largely exogenous to individual households. Among these fuel pri-
ce elasticities, the discussion provided in this section suggests selecting the fuel price
elasticity of transport demand, ηpe(s), for estimating the rebound effect, rather than
employing other fuel- or service price elasticities that have been applied in the litera-
ture.
3 Data
The data used in this research is drawn from the German Mobility Panel (MOP 2011),
an ongoing travel survey that was initiated in 1994. The panel is organized in over-
lapping waves, each comprising a group of households surveyed for a period of six
weeks in the spring for three consecutive years. All households that participate in the
survey are requested to fill out a questionnaire eliciting general household informati-
on, person-related characteristics, and relevant aspects of everyday travel behavior. In
addition, respondents record the price paid for fuel, the liters of fuel consumed, and
the kilometers driven for every car in the household.
The data used in this paper cover thirteen years, spanning 1997 through 2009, a
period during which real fuel prices rose 1.97% per annum on average. The resulting
sample includes 2,165 households, 962 of which appear one year in the data, 474 of
which appear two years and 729 of which appear three consecutive years. Altogether,
we are faced with 4,097 observations. We use the travel survey information, which
is recorded at the level of the automobile, to derive the dependent and explanatory
variables required for estimating Definition 4 of the rebound effect. The dependent va-
riable, which is converted into monthly figures to adjust for minor variations in the
survey duration, is the total monthly distance driven in kilometers. The key explanato-
ry variable for identifying the direct rebound effect is the price paid for fuel per liter.3
Table 1 contains the definitions and descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the
3The price series was deflated using a consumer price index for Germany obtained from DESTATIS
(2010).
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modeling.
Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
s Monthly kilometers driven 1,110 689
pe Real fuel price in Euros per liter 1.03 0.15
# employed Number of employed household members 1.03 0.86
vacation with car Dummy: 1 if household undertook 0.22 –
vacation with car during the survey period
children Dummy: 1 if children younger 0.35 –
than 19 live in household
job change Dummy: 1 if an employed household member
changed jobs within the preceding year 0.11 –
multi-car households Dummy: 1 if an household has more than one car 0.35 –
income Real Household income in 1,000 Euros 2.11 0.66
population density People per square km in the county in which the 953 1,072
household is situated
The suite of control variables selected for inclusion in the model measure the
socio-economic attributes that are hypothesized to influence the extent of motorized
travel. These capture the demographic composition of the household, its income, the
surrounding population density, and dummies indicating the availability of multiple
cars, whether the household undertook a vacation with the car during the survey pe-
riod, and whether any employed member of the household changed jobs in the prece-
ding year.
4 Methodology
Focusing on Definition 4 and additionally allowing for asymmetric fuel price respon-
ses, we estimate the following model specification, where the logged monthly vehicle-
kilometers traveled, ln(s), is regressed on those logged fuel prices ln(p+) that are ob-
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served after a price increase from year t− 1 to t, and those logged fuel prices ln(p−)
that are observed after a price decrease from year t− 1 to t, as well as a vector of control
variables x described in the previous section:
ln(sit) = α0 + αp+ · ln(p+it) + αp− · ln(p−it) + αTx · xit + ξi + νit . (5)
Subscripts i and t are used to denote the observation and time period, respectively,
and the superscript T designates the transposition of a vector. ξi denotes an unknown
individual-specific term, and νit is a random component that varies over individuals
and time.
To distinguish between the response to rising and falling prices, two price varia-
bles, p+ and p−, are included in specification (5), with price variable p+ being defined
as p+it = pit, if pit > pi(t−1), and p+it = 0 otherwise, while p− is generated from fal-
ling prices in a similar way. Since travel demand shrinks with increasing fuel prices,
the coefficients of both price variables, p− and p+, should be negative, as is confirmed
by our estimation results presented below.
Given this specification of asymmetric fuel price responses, where a priori αp+
can be assumed to differ from αp− , we argue that the rebound is to be identified by
the negative coefficient estimate of ln(p−), as the rebound effect occurs in response to
a decrease in unit cost for car travel due to improved fuel efficiency. The case where
αp+ 6= αp− and, hence, demand responses to price increases differ in magnitude from
those to price decreases could be visualized by demand curves kinked at the current
price, so that demand is related to increasing and decreasing prices in an asymmetric
way (DARGAY, 1992:168). For single-vehicle households that do not change their car
within the survey period, as in our case, the intuition behind such kinked demand
curves may be that these households react to price rises with a fuel-saving driving
behavior that they maintain even when prices fall to original levels. DARGAY and GA-
TELY (1997:72) have referred to this behavior as “addiction asymmetry”, reflecting the
proclivity of consumers to more readily adapt new habits than abandon them.
Whether this is actually the case can be examined by testing the following null
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hypothesis:
H0 : αp+ = αp− , (6)
which, if correct, implies that model (5) reduces to the reversible specifications that
are typically employed to estimate the rebound effect (see e. g. FRONDEL, PETERS, and
VANCE, 2008). If, however, H0 is rejected, we have reason to believe that the rebound
effect should be identified by the negative of the estimate of αp− .
While choosing specification (5), we deliberately refrain from employing classical
models, such as the jagged ratchet model proposed by WOLFFRAM (1971), the ratchet
specification of TRAILL et al. (1978), and the price decomposition approach employed
by GATELY (1992), that have been suggested in the literature in order to capture poten-
tially different responses to rising and falling prices. The reason for abstaining from the
application of these models is that they are highly dependent on the starting point of
the data (GRIFFIN, SCHULMAN, 2005:7). As is further illustrated by GRIFFIN, SCHUL-
MAN (2005:7), a second troubling aspect of the price decomposition approach, which
includes the ratchet models as special cases, is that the demand curve can shift inward
purely due to price volatility, although the average price level remains fixed.
Finally, our data base does not allow for the application of the price decompositi-
on approach, nor for error-correction models, so that we cannot account for some sort
of dynamic adjustment mechanisms to long-run relationships, as is done by DARGAY
(1992), for instance. Instead, we employ a quasi-static approach in which the inward
shift of the demand function is captured by year dummies, thereby leaving the form
and curvature of the demand function unchanged. In fact, in our empirical example we
have reason to believe that there are only moderate shifts of the demand function, as
we focus on households that have not changed their cars over the three years they are
surveyed. This belief is confirmed by the fact that the year dummies included in the
estimation specification are statistically insignificant both individually and as a whole,
and have therefore been left out in our final estimations presented in the subsequent
section.
To provide for a reference point for the results obtained from panel estimation
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methods (see e. g. FRONDEL and VANCE, 2010, for a discussion), we also estimate spe-
cification (5) using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). While the fixed-effects esti-
mator may be a potentially superior alternative, we ultimately focus on random-effects
methods, as the fixed-effects estimator fails to efficiently estimate the coefficients of
time-persistent variables, i. e. , variables that do not vary much within a household
over time. Furthermore, the random-effects estimator is particularly attractive when
the cross-section information, here determined by the number of households, is much
larger than the number of time-series observations (HSIAO, 2003), as is the case for
our database. Not least, random-effects methods also allow for the estimation of coef-
ficients of time-invariant variables, which is precluded by the fixed-effects estimator.
5 Empirical Results
In line with our reasoning of the previous section, the fixed-effects estimates reported
in Table 2 are statistically insignificant for almost all variables included; this is clearly
the result of very low variability of time-persistent variables, such as the presence of
children or the number of licensed drivers. Moreover, we perform the classical test of
BREUSCH and PAGAN (1979) to examine the superiority of the random-effects model
over an OLS estimation using pooled data. The test statistic of this Lagrange multiplier
test of χ2(1) = 176.03 clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity among
households: Var(ξi) = 0.
In our discussion of the empirical results, we therefore focus on the random-
effects estimates. Several features of the results reported in the right-hand panel of
Table 2 bear highlighting. First, while we prefer the model specification related to De-
finition 4 for reasons presented in Section 2 and identify the rebound by the negative
estimate of the coefficient of ln(p−), the estimated rebound effect of 58% suggests that
some 58% of the potential energy savings due to an efficiency improvement is lost to
increased driving. Also of note is that this estimate perfectly fits to the rebound range
of 58% to 59% estimated by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008) for the sub-sample
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of single-vehicle German households observed between 1997 and 2005.
Table 2: Estimation Results for Travel Demand of Single-Vehicle Households.4
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(p+) ∗∗-0.663 (0.166) 0.258 (0.244) ∗∗-0.560 (0.149)
ln(p−) ∗∗-0.689 (0.157) 0.186 (0.294) ∗∗-0.584 (0.168)
children 0.005 (0.024) 0.026 (0.090) 0.028 (0.031)
income ∗∗0.088 (0.034) 0.034 (0.053) ∗0.065 (0.031)
# employed ∗∗0.177 (0.030) 0.106 (0.060) ∗∗ 0.117 (0.030)
job change ∗∗0.168 (0.053) ∗∗ 0.179 (0.066) ∗∗ 0.179 (0.048)
vacation with car ∗∗0.448 (0.042) ∗∗ 0.314 (0.051) ∗∗ 0.374 (0.039)
population density ∗-0.054 (0.026) 0.303 (0.298) ∗-0.049 (0.021)
constants ∗∗6.440 (0.076) ∗∗ 6.596 (0.306) ∗∗ 6.532 (0.069)
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Observations used: 1,125. Number of households: 744.
Second, even without performing any tests, a superficial inspection of the coeffi-
cient estimates of ln(p−) and ln(p+) tells us that the null hypothesis H0 : αp+ = αp−
cannot be rejected. While this impression is confirmed by a very low χ2-statistic of
χ2(1) = 0.02, the very close estimates of -0.560 and -0.584 may indicate that changes
in driving behavior that are potentially induced by price peaks are entirely reversed
when prices fall back to original levels. In our example, therefore, the issue of whether
to identify the rebound via distinguishing between demand responses due to fuel price
increases or decreases appears to be moot.5
4To correct for the non-independence of repeated observations from the same households over the
years of the survey, observations are clustered at the level of the household, and the presented OLS
standard errors are robust to this survey design feature.
5If we estimate the restrictive reversible specification, with no allowance made for price increases
and decreases, more plausible results are obtained from a fixed-effects estimation. The estimate of -0.46
for the logged fuel price as the key explanatory variable, presented in Table A1 in the appendix, is
statistically significant and of roughly the same magnitude as the elasticities received from the random-
effects model presented in Table 2.
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These results, however, may not be surprising given the fact that we delibera-
tely focus here on single-vehicle households that do not change their car during the
survey period. We thus augment our sample by including multi-vehicle households.
Fundamental differences, though, cannot be observed from Table 3, possibly due to the
fact that multi-vehicle households comprise a relatively small share, 36%, of the entire
sample. Most notably, there is again no empirical evidence for asymmetric fuel price
responses, suggesting the validity of the reversible specification.6
Table 3: Estimation Results for Travel Demand if Multi-Car Households are included.
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(p+) ∗∗-0.590 (0.145) -0.018 (0.189) ∗∗-0.448 (0.127)
ln(p−) ∗∗-0.589 (0.142) 0.027 (0.233) ∗∗-0.480 (0.131)
children 0.030 (0.021) 0.007 (0.072) ∗ 0.053 (0.021)
income ∗∗0.128 (0.030) -0.034 (0.042) ∗∗ 0.096 (0.026)
# employed ∗∗0.150 (0.026) -0.087 (0.053) ∗∗ 0.109 (0.026)
job change ∗∗0.118 (0.040) ∗∗ 0.111 (0.047) ∗∗ 0.113 (0.036)
vacation with car ∗∗0.406 (0.036) ∗∗ 0.275 (0.048) ∗∗ 0.341 (0.033)
multi-car households ∗∗0.442 (0.045) 0.148 (0.130) ∗∗ 0.472 (0.045)
population density ∗∗-0.059 (0.023) 0.080 (0.227) ∗-0.052 (0.021)
constants ∗∗6.385 (0.066) ∗∗ 6.960 (0.230) ∗∗ 6.482 (0.060)
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
Observations used: 1,470. Number of households: 994.
Yet, a comparison of the estimation results reported in Tables 2 and 3 and in the
appendix indicates that the travel demand responsiveness of single-car households
to fuel prices is somewhat more pronounced than that of multi-car households – alt-
hough the discrepancies are not statistically significant. This may be due the fact that
in multi-car households drivers are able to choose among the most efficient cars for
6As presented in the appendix, the fixed-effects model using the reversible specification yields a
statistically significant elasticity estimate of -0.21.
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their traveling purposes. This difference would also explain why the elasticity estima-
tes reported by FRONDEL, PETERS, and VANCE (2008), which were based exclusively
on single car households, are on the high side of those appearing in the literature. Fi-
nally, it bears noting that much of the research on this topic, particularly that using
household level data, is drawn from the US, where elasticity estimates may be lower
because of longer driving distances and fewer alternative modes.
There are additional discrepancies emerging from the multiple-vehicle sample:
While the presence of children, for example, positively affects travel demand for the
whole sample, this variable does not play a significant role in determining the travel
behavior of single-car households. This may be due to the fact that single-car hou-
seholds prioritize car use for commuting, requiring children to use public transport
systems more frequently. Conversely, the dummy variable indicating a job change in
the previous year has a larger effect for the single-car households, which substantiates
the logic that such households use the car primarily for commuting purposes.
6 Summary and Conclusion
Drawing on household level mobility data from Germany, the principal aim of this
paper has been to test for evidence of an asymmetric response to fluctuations in fuel
prices. Although several studies have shown that the negative demand response to
fuel price increases is higher in magnitude than the positive response to fuel price de-
creases, the question as to whether this reflects a behavioral reaction or a manifestation
of technical change continues to stimulate discussion. Our interest in this question re-
lates to its implications for the estimation of the rebound effect, the behaviorally indu-
ced offset in the reduction of energy consumption following efficiency improvements
(CRANDALL, 1992).
By using panel data comprised of households who did not change their automo-
bile during the survey period, our econometric analysis was structured to allow for
asymmetric price responses while at the same time ruling out the possibility that these
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arise from technical change. We argue that were an asymmetry to be detected, it would
require us to specifically reference the fuel price elasticity derived from price decreases
in order to identify the rebound effect. Failure to do so would result in an upwardly
biased estimate of the rebound, presuming that the response to price increases was
indeed greater than to decreases.
Our empirical estimates suggest that concerns about such bias are unsubstantia-
ted. We have failed to reject the null hypothesis that the magnitude of the response to
a price increase is equal to that of a price decrease. One implication emerging from this
finding may be that the price asymmetry observed in many other studies is largely the
result of the sunk-cost nature of energy-saving capital equipment, rather than behavi-
oral inertia on the part of consumers. Even so, our symmetry finding also maintains
when we expand the sample to include households owning multiple cars.
From a policy perspective, the fact that the estimated rebound is relatively high
calls into question the effectiveness of the European Union’s current emphasis on effi-
ciency standards as a pollution control instrument. The random-effects estimate of the
rebound amounts to 58%, which is virtually the same as that obtained by FRONDEL,
PETERS, and VANCE (2008), who used an abridged version of the current data set that
extended to the year 2005.
Since that time, annually averaged fuel prices climbed another 9% to reach a peak
in 2008, followed by a drop of 9% in the following year (ARAL 2011). These fluctuations
appear to have had no bearing on a key conclusion emerging from the data, namely
that nearly 60% of the potential energy saving from efficiency improvements in Ger-
many is lost to increased driving. Given this response, we would would argue that fuel
taxes should continue to play an important role in climate policy. Unlike fuel efficiency
standards, fuel taxes directly confront motorists with the costs of driving, thereby en-
couraging the purchase of more fuel efficient vehicles and having an immediate impact
on driving behavior.
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Appendix
Proposition: If service demand s solely depends on ps, fuel prices pe are exogenous,
and energy efficiency µ is constant, then
ηpe(s) = ηps(s).
Proof: Using price relation ps = pe/µ, the chain rule, and the assumption that the
service amount s solely depends on the price ps, we obtain
ηpe(s) =
∂ ln s
∂ ln pe
=
∂ ln s
∂ ln ps
· ∂ ln ps
∂ ln pe
= ηps(s) ·
∂ ln(pe/µ)
∂ ln pe
= ηps(s) · [
∂ ln pe
∂ ln pe
− ∂ ln µ
∂ ln pe
] = ηps(s) · [1−
∂ ln µ
∂ ln pe
] = ηps(s),
where the last term in the most right bracket vanishes if efficiency µ is constant, i. e. ,
if ∂ ln µ∂ ln pe = 0.
Table A1: Fixed-Effects Estimation Results for Reversible Specifications.
Single-Vehicle Multi-Vehicle
Households Households
Coeff.s Std. Errors Coeff.s Std. Errors
ln(p) ∗∗-0.458 (0.111) ∗∗-0.206 (0.095)
children 0.014 (0.056) 0.005 (0.033)
income 0.001 (0.025) 0.003 (0.021)
# employed 0.066 (0.035) 0.018 (0.031)
job change 0.049 (0.037) 0.030 (0.026)
vacation with car ∗∗0.306 (0.031) ∗∗ 0.250 (0.024)
multi-car households – – ∗∗ 0.337 (0.053)
population density ∗0.167 (0.084) ∗ 0.128 (0.010)
constants ∗∗6.674 (0.100) ∗∗ 6.821 (0.104)
Observations used: 2,969 4,104
Number of households: 1,668 2,166
Note: ∗ denotes significance at the 5 %-level and ∗∗ at the 1 %-level, respectively.
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